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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES.
Recent English Cases-Queen's Bench, 60, 630.
Recent American Cases-Pennsylvania,
119, 181, 445, 508.
Recent English Cases--House of Lords,
- 266
Recent American Cases--Georgia,
- 817, 879
Recent English Cases--Criminal Law, .57&
Recent American Cases-U. S. Circuit Court-Pennsylvania,
696
Recent American Cases-Virginia,
768.
ACTION.
See Warrants.
An action lies at Common Law in a free State by the owner of a fugitive
slave, against one who knowingly harbors and conceals the latter; and the
Act of Congress of 1793, has not destroyed' this right,
- 279;
ACTS OF ASSEMBLY.
See Construction.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
See Construction.
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION.
See Constitutional Iaw.
ADMIRALTY.
See Lien-Seaworthiness.
AGENCY.
See Married Woman's Act.
1. The general rule of the common law that the authority of the agent
ceases with the death of the principal stated and affirmed, Steere vs. Ellis, 631'
2. The only recognized exception to the general rule above stated, is.
where a power is coupled -with an interest, in which case it survives the
person giving it, and may be executed after his death. Id.
3. Where B. G. E. authorized, by a simple memorandum in writing, E.
E. to sign checks in his name during his absence, and E. E., by virtue of
such power, drew three checks after the death of B. G. E., the agent acting bona fide and in ignorance of his principal's death; held, that his authority not being coupled with an interest, expired with the death of the
principal, and that the banker having paid such unauthorized checks, was
still liable to the administrator of the decedent for the sums so paid. Id.
ALIEN.
The next of kin of the testator were three brothers and sisters of the
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whole blood, and a brother and sister of the half blood. These last, by
the law of descents of Virginia, were entitled to half portions. This half
brother and half sister were born in Ireland, and were never naturalized
by any act of their own. But their father, also an Irishman by birth, was
naturalized under the-law of- Virginia, in 1787. The two children last referred to, were then ininors living in Ireland, came to Virginia in 1792,
and resided there until after 1802, when an act of Congress was passed,
declaring that the children of persons duly naturalized under any of the
laws of the United States, or who, previous to the passage of any law
on that subject by the government of the United States, may have become
citizens of any one of the said States under the laws thereof, being
under the age of twenty-one years, at the time of their parents being @o
naturalized, shall, if dwelling in theUnited States, be considered as citizens
of the United States. These children were naturalized by this Act of Congress, and so, capable of acquiring title to real estate by descent.
King.

.

..

Vint s.
.

712

AMBASSADOR.
1. A councillor of legation of a foreign sovereign, who has the charge
of the executive of the said legation, subject to the directions of the minister plenipotentiary, and who acts as charge d'affaires in the absence of
such minister, is "a public minister of a foreign prince" within the meaning of the 7 Ann, a. 12, and entitled as such to the privileges of an ambassador. Taylor vs. Best.
550
2. An ambassador who voluntarily appears to an action brought against
him and other defendants in thi$ country, as joint contractors, and who
thus submits to the jurisdiction of the Court, is not entitled to have the
proceedings set aside, or the action stayed against him, on the ground of
his being privileged, as an ambassador, from suit, if no step has been
taken by the plaintiff in the action to interfere with his person or property. Id.
8. Qonre, if an ambassador can, in invitum, be sued in this country,
when process is not directed against his person, or such goods of his as
are connected with his comfoi-t and dignity as ambassador? Id..
4. Semble, where the privilege of an ambassador attadhes, it is not lost
by. the ambassador being engiaged in trade. Id. APPEAL.
See Costs-Error.
ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE.
Relation of, see Vint vs. King,

-
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ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
See Fugitive Slave.
ATTACHMENT.
See Foreign Attachment-Lien-Ship.
BILL IN CHANCERY.
See Equity.
BILL OF EXCHANGE.
See Promissory Note..
In an action against the drawer of a bill of exchange not bearing interest, which has been dishonored by non-acceptance, if the jury find the
plaintiff entitled to interest by wa of damages, the measure of damages
is the rate of interest at the place where the bill was drawn. Gibbs vs.
Fremont.
113
BILL OF LADING.
See Ship Owners.
BOND.
See Neutrality Laws.
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CASES COMMUENTED ON.
Millar vs. Taylor in Stowe vs. Thomas.-Per GutmE, J.
Cassiday vs. McKenzie in Steere vs. Ellis.-Per Pin=B, Ch.

-

210
631

CASES DISSENTED FROM.
- 279
Jones vs. Vanzant in Van Metter vs. Mitchell.
The Sea Bird vs. Bechler in Devinney vs. The Memphis.-Per PnTL.,
- 666
_
Ch.
CASES QUESTIONED.
- 666
Carryl vs. Taylor in Devinney vs. The Memphis.-Per PIrTLE, Ch.
CATTLE.
See Fence.
CHARITABLE INSTITUTION.
See Will.
CITY SUBSCRIPTIONS
See Constitutional Law.
CRIMINAL CODE OF LOUISIANA.
See Will.
COMMISSION MERCHANT.
See Usage.
COMITY OF STATES.
1. National comity being a principle of the law of nations, constitutes a
part of th civil jurisprudence of every State. Therefore, when the rule is
settled by which the right is to be determined, and which would prevail in
the Courts of this State, where the contract was entered intb, we ascertain
the rule by which, under the "jus gentium privatum," the tribunals of a
foreign State would be guided in determining the rights of the parties
- 604
arising out of the contract: Lyon vs. Knott,
2. Hence, though by the laws of Texas where the wife died childless, her
next of kin succeed to her separate property, yet, as by the laws of Mississippi, where the contract of marriage was had in such event, the husband
is entitled; in the conflict upon principles of settled law his rights must
prevail. Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
1. A bill of lading was signed by the master of a bark at Belfast, ac-knowledging to have received 220 tons of pig iron, to be delivered at the
port of New York. About fifty tons of the iron was lost at New York,.
while the bark was discharging her cargo, .by the breaking and sinking of
the pile wharf or bridge upon which the iron had been improperly placed ,
and for this loss the bark was libelled in Admiralty; hed, that the iron was
lost before delivery to the consignees by the carrier, and that by the terms
of the bill of lading the bark was liable for such loss. Vose vs. Allen, - 63
2. The liability of a carrier under a bill of lading continues until the
merchandise is safely delivered to the consignee at the port of discharge,
or placed in such a situation there as to be equivalent to a safe delivery,
and the carrier is not discharged of the custody of the goods until thia
I
is done. Id.
3. In regard to foreign voyages, under a bill of lading in the usual form,
the carrier is not bound to make a personal delivery of the merchandise to
the consignee, but it is sufficient if he lands it at the proper wharf, and in
the ordinary manner, and gives reasonable notice to the consignee thereof.
Such landing, with such notice, is equivalent to a personal delivery. Id.
CONFESSION.
Confession induced by the appliance of hope or fear is not admissible
in evidence; but if facts are elicited by such confession, they may be given
in evidence. So where a witness offered to render such assistance to a
prisoner charged with murder, as he might desire, and the prisoner requested him to tell his brother to write that letter, and that he, the witness,
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would then place the letter in the post-office at a particular place, and the
witness carried the message. obtained the letter, and instead of placing it
in the office delivered it to the prosecutor, and it was read in evidence on
the trial: Held, that it was rightly received in evidence, and the fact that
the prisoncr was deceived by the witness did not render the evidence inadmissible. Gates vs. The People,
- 671
CONSIDERATION.
See Contract.
CONSPIRACY.
1. A conspiracy to induce a third person to do an illegal act, whether
malum in 8e, or one-prohibited under statutory penalties, for the purpose of
afterwards extorting money by compounding the offence, is indictable.
Hazen vs. Commonwealth,
.
.
.
.
. 654
2. An indictment for a conspiracy to "solicit, induce and procure" the
officers of a banking corporation to violate the Pennsylvania Act of 1850,
prohibiting the virculation of small notes under penalties, alleging the purpose of the defendants to have been to compel the said officers "unjustly
and unlawfully" to pay large sums of money "for the corrupt gain" of the
defendants, which was to be effected through compounding the offence:
Held good after verdict. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. Where an act has been regularly passed by the legislative power,
some portions of which are accordant with, and some repugnant to constitutional provisions, the former will be valid, and the latter void. -Fisher
vs. McGirr,

...

.

. 460

2. From the terms, context and purpose of the Massachusetts enactment, commonly known as the "Maine Liquor Law," it.is intended to
make the keeping and selling liquors unlawful, and to bring the offence
within the jurisdiction of the local magistrates. Id.
8. It is competent for the law making power to declare the possession of
certain articles of property, held in particular places and under particular
circumstances, to be unlawful, and the property so held may be declared
forfeited, but such unlawfulness and forfeiture -must be established and
authorized in a manner consistent with the principles of justice and the
established maxims of jurisprudence, and must not be repugnant to the
provisions of the Declaration of Rights, or the Constitution. Certain provisions of the statute under discussion are so repugnant, therefore held unconstitutional and void. Id.
4. This part of the act is unconstitutional, because-First, it warrants
and requires unreasonable searches and seizures. Second, because it interferes with the regulation of foreign commerce. Third, because the precautions and safeguards for the security of persons. and property are disregarded. Fourth,because the act contains no provision for the judicial trial
of the party accused, such trial being the only mode provided in the Declaration of Rights by which crime can be established against the citizen.
.Ftklh, because the complaint setting out the offence is not required by the
act to do it fully, substantially or formally, and makes no provision for
indictment or information, on which issue can be joined and trial had. 1d.
5.' The power of enacting general laws cannot be delegated by the legislative body even to the people from whom all governmental powers originally emanated.
-

-

Collins,

Per DoUoLAss, J., all the judges assenting.
-

-

People vs.
-

6. Sections. 18, 19 and 20 of the Michigan law, entitled "An Act prohibiting the manufacture.of intoxicating beverages and the traffic therein,"
approved February 11, 1853, are void, because an attempted delegation of
legislative power to the people. Per WiNo, PRATT, DOUOaASS and CoPELAmD, JJ. Id.
7. Powers of local legislation, or rather powers of adnpinistrative ].egislation, are not within the principle, and may be delegated; neither are
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enactments in the nature of propositionswhere mere acceptance calls the
law in force. Id.
8. In determining whether an act of the legislature is constitutional, we
must look to the body of the constitution itself for the reasons.. The general principles of justice, liberty and right not contained or expressed in
that instrument are no proper elements to base a judicial decision upon.
27, 85
Sharpless vs. The Mayor of Philadelphia,
9. If such an act be a written general grant of legislative power, that is,
if being a law, and if it be not forbidden expressly or impliedly, either by
the State or federal constitution, it is valid. 2d.
10. To make it void, it must be clearly not an exercise of legislative
authority, or else be forbidden so plainly as to leave the case free from all
doubt. Id.
11. An Act of Assembly authorizing subscriptions by a city to the stock
of a railroad corporation, is not forbidden in article 1st, section 13th of
the State constitution; that section not being a restriction upon the legislative authority of the two Houses, but the bestowal of privilege upon the
separate branches. Id.
12. Such an iet does not impair the obligation of any existing contracts,
nor does it attempt an impossibility by creating a contract; but merely
authorizbs the corporations to make one if they shall see proper. Id.
13. This is not such an injury to plaintiffs' lands, goods or persons that
they are entitled to judicial remedy for it, agreeably to section 11, article
9. It is no injury at all, except on the gratuitous assumption that it is forbidden in some other part of the constitution. Id.
14. It does not violate the right of acquiring, preserving or protecting
property secured by section 1st, article 9. The right of property is not so
absolute that it may be taxed for public benefit. Id.
15. This is not a taking of private property for public use without compensation, contrary to section 10, article 9. Where property is not seized
and directly appropriated to public use, though subjected in the hands of
the owner to greater burdens than before, it is not taken. Id.
16. It cannot be said that the plaintiffs will be deprived of their property in violation of section 11th, article 9. The settled meaning of the
word "deprive," as there used, is the same as that of "taken" in section
10. Id.
17. An Act of Assembly to authorize the taking of private property for
private use would be unconstitutional, because it would not be legislation,
but a mere decree between private parties; but this is no taking in any
sense, for any purposes or for any uses. Id.
18. Plaintiffs have no ground for complaint against the Acts of Assembly
now in question because they authorize the creation of a public debt, of
which they may be required hereafter to pay a part in the shape of taxes,
for by taxation alone can any harm ever come to them. Id.
19. If it be within the scope of our legislative powers, with consent of
the local authorities, to permit assessments of local taxes, for the purpose
of assisting the corporation to build railroads, bearing to tax payers the
relation which these roads. do, then the laws complained of are unobjectionable. Id.
20. Taxation is a legislative iight and duty which must be exercised by
the General Assembly through the medium of laws passed by them under
their authority. Id.
21. The power of the Assembly with reference to taxation is limited by
their own discretion. For its abuse, members are accountableto nobody
but their own constituents. Id.
22. By taxation is meant a certain mode of raising revenue, for public
purposes, in which the community that pays it have an interest. The right
oT the State to lay taxes has no greater extent than this. Id.
23. The act of a Legislature authorizing 'ontributions to be levied for
a mere private purpose, or for a purpose which, although public, is one in
which the people, from whom they are exacted, have no interest, would not
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be law, but a sentence commanding a judicial payment of a certain sum by
one portion or class of people to another-the power to make such a law is
not legislative, but judicial, and was not given to the Assembly by the
general grant of legislative authority. Id.
24. But to make a tax law unconstitutional, when thus granted, it must
be apparent that the community taxed can have no possible interest in the
purpose to which their money is to be applied. This is more especially
true if it be a local tax. Local authorities have themselves levied taxes in
pursuance of an act of Assembly. Id.
25. If, therefore, making a railroad be a mere private affair, or if the
people of Philadelphia have manifestly no interest in the railroads which
run to and towards the city from Easton, and from Wheeling, then the laws
are unconstitutional. Id.
26. But if railroads are not private affairs, are but public improvements,
then it is the right and duty of the State to advance commerce and promote
the welfare of the people, by making them, or causing them to be made, at
the public expense. Id.
27. If the State declines to make desirable or public improvements, she
may permit it to be done by companies. The fact that it is made by a
private corporation, does not take away its character as a public work. Id.
28. The right of the company by which it is made, to be compensated
for the expense of constructing it, by taking tolls for its use, though it
gives the corlioration an interest in it, it does not extinguish the interest of
the public, nor make the work private, because, to say nothing of other
advantages, though the, public may pay toll, still they can travel on it
much cheaper than without it. Id.
29. The State may, therefore, rightfully aid in the execution of such
public works by delegating to corporations the right of eminent domain, as
she always does, or by the execution of the taxing jower, as she does very
often. Id.
30. The right of local authorities to tax a particular city for local improvement is as clear a right as to lay a general tax for any public purpose
whatsoever. Id.
31.- If the State having constitutional power can create a State debt by
a subscription in behalf of the whole people to the stock of private corporations engaged in making public works, it follows from what has been
before said that she may authorize a city or district to do the same thing,
provided such city or district has a special interest in the work to be so
aided. Id.
32. There is not a case in which we can determine as matter of law that
the city has no interest in the proposed railroads. That this is true as
matter of fact has not even been asserted in argument; only a little more
than intimated. Id.
33. If the Legislature and -the Councils decide that, the city has an
interest large enough to justify these subscriptions, we cannot gainsay this
without declaring all interest to be flatly impossible, and to do that would
be absurd. Id.
34. Finally, if the authorities of the city, in accordance with their charter, and with certain laws supplementary thereto, are about to create a
public debt for public purposes, in which the city has an interest, it will
be as valid and bifiding as if it had been legally contracted to accomplish
any other public purpose for the benefit of the city. Opinion per Black,
Ch. 3. Woodward & Knox, J. J., assenting; Lewis & Lowrie, JJ., dissenting. Id.
35. The prohibition in the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States to the effect that no State, without the consent of
Congress, "1shall enter into any agrebment or contract with another State,
or with a foreign power," is political in its character, and has no reference
to a mere matter of contract, or to the grant of a franchise which in nowise
conflicts with the powers delegated to the General Government by the
States.

Union Branch R. R. vs. Tenn. & Georgia R. R. --

-
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33. A corporation can have no legal existence out of the sovereignty by
which it is created; but its existence, as a person capable of contracting
may be recognized in another State, and as such, it may be there contracted
with. Id.
CONSTRUCTION.
See Will.
CONSTRUCTION OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY.
See Maryland. Constitutional Law.
Georgia-Acts of 1840, 1847, 1849,
03
Mfaryland-Act of 1809, 1853, in re Walsh,
542
Michigan-Act of 1853, in The People vs. Collins,
- 591
Mississippi-A.pt of 1839, in Lyon vs. Knott, 604
Pennsylvania-Constitution of, art. I, sect. 13, and art IX, sects. 1, 10
and 11, in Sharpless vs. The Mayor,
27, 85
Act of 22d April, 1704; Sunday Law in Com. vs. Johnston, 27, 85
CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES.
10th section, 1st article,
- 03
CONSTRUCTION OF ACTS OF CONGRESS.
Act of March 3, 1851, sects. 2 and 8, in Wattson vs. Marks,
- 157
Act of March 2, 1833, c. 57, sect. 7, Force Bill, in ex parte Jenkins,
144
Act of September 18, 1850, Fugitive Slave Law in exparte Jenkins,
- 143
Act of 1819, Passenger Act, 1847, 1849, sect. 10, in the United States
vs. The Anna,
421
Act of March 31, 1830, sects. 4 and 5, in Wright vs. Shumway, 20
CONTEMPT..
1. Cases of contempt were not cases for juries at common law, or under
the Constitution; and the statute does not now require a jury to find the
imprisonment beyond a day, where an order of the Court has been violated.
Ex parts Alexander,
.
.
.
.
.
44
2. When we adopted the common law in this country, we did not adopt
all the power exerciscd'under it; but American principles regulate the
power. Id.
3. A commitment for contempt "untiZ the further order of the Court," is
void. Id.
4. The power to punish contempt is a power only of necessity-what
ought to be done where a party cannot strictly comply with an order of
Court. Ifd.
CONTRACT.
See Insurance, Sunday.
The power of Courts of Equity to set aside and annul executed contracts
on the ground of inadequacy of consideration, is a most delicate one, and
should be applied with extreme caution. Mere inadequacy of consideration
is not to be understood in equity as constituting per 8e, a ground to avoid a
contract, unless it be so gross as to shock the conscience. In such cases,
it is evidence per se, sufficient to avoid it. But where the contract is one
of hazard, and the question whether it will be profitable or ruinous is
dependent on future contingencies, the issue of which no human foresight
can discover, the Court has nb satisfactory standard by which to determine
whether the price was inadequate or no, much less whether the inadequacy
was so gross as to constituteper ze evidence of fraud: and it should refuse
to interfere with the legal operation of the contract. Vint vs. King,
- 712
COPYRIGHT.
1. When an author has sold his book, the only property which he reserves
to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply
the copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to
the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed; and this, which the
law terms an author's "copy" or "copyright," embraces nothing more.
Stowe vs. Thomas,
210
2. There is'no difference, as respects the character or quality of the
right, between the right and property of an author at common law, under
the statute of 8 Anne, o. 19, and under the acts of Congress respecting
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copyrights; and that description 6f an infringement which would be applicable in the one case, is applicable in the others. Id.
3. A "coTy" of a book must be a transcript of the languagein which the
conceptions of the author are clothed, of something printed and embodied
m a tangible shape. Id.
4. In questions of infringement of copyright, the question is not whether
the defendant has used the thoughts, conceptions, information or discoveries promulgated by the original, but whether his composition-may be
considered a newwork, requiring invention, learning and judgment, or only
a mere transcript of the whole or parts of the original, with merely colorable variations. Id.
5. The case of Millar vs. Taylor (4 Burr. 2803) has finally settled the question
as to the nature of the property which an author has in his works; and
the inference that a translation is not an infringement of copyright, is a
logical resulfand a necessary corollary, from the principles of law then
decided. Id.
6. The distinction taken by some, between works which are publcjZuriff,
and those which are subject to copyright, has no foundation in fact; if the
established doctrine of the cases be true, and the author's property in a
published book consists only in a right of copy. Id.
7. A translation can, in no correct sense, be called a "copy" of a book.
Id.
CORPORATION.
See Constitutional Law. Way. Will. Repeal.
COSTS.
See Trial by Jury.
In any case where'damages would have been recoverable at common law,
the plaintiff is entitled to costs, notwithstanding that a new and different
mode of proceeding has been introduced by statute. Therefore, under the
general Plank Road Act of Pennsylvania, of 7th April, 1849, which provides for the assessment of damages under the act by freeholders, upon
which assessment judgment is to be entered before a justice of the peace,
with an appeal, as in ordinary cases, a plaintiff, succeeding in an appeal,
is entitled to costs. Beardsley vs. The Honesdale Plank Road Co.,
- 660
COURT.
See Trial by Jury.
The Court may, in its discretion, permit witnesses to testify in chief, on
the part of the prosecution, whose names have not been furnished to the
prisoner prior to his arraignment. Gates vs. The People,
- 671
CRIMINAL LAW.
See Bond. Evidence. Neutrality Laws. Trial by Jury.
DAMAGES.
See Bills of Exchange. Costs. De Injuria.
1. To a plea of justification in trespass gu. cl. fr., &c., that the acts
complained of were rightfully done by the defendants, under an authority
vested in them as tax collectors, to enter and distrain for taxes due them
in that capacity, the plaintiff replied, protesting that the defendants were
not collectors, and that. no tax was due, de injuria, as to the residue of the
plea. Held good. Curry vs. Hoffman,
- 246
2. How far de injuria may be replied generally to a justification under
authority in law, not derived from a Court of record, guasre. Id.
DELIVERY.
See Common Carriers.
DEVISE.
See Wills.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
The land which is taken under the right of eminent domain which exists
in the State, for the use of a rail road, becomes so far the property of the
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rail road corporation, that their right is exclusive in its use and possession
during the existence of the easement; and those from whom the land is
taken, retain no right to its use or occupation, for pasturage or otherwise.
. 232
.
.
.
Hurd vs. The Rutland Railroad.
EQUITY.
See Contract.
1. Quere, whether the recitals of a deed executed by a grantor to a
grantee, tending to show the execution of a former deed by the same
grantor to another grantee, estop the grantor and those claiming under
him from denying the fact of the execution of such deed ? This question
cannot be determined unless the party claiming a benefit under such deed,
puts the fact of its execution distinctly in issue by bringing his bill to set
it up as a lost deed, averring its execution and loss. Vint vs. Heirs of
King.

-

.

.
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2. A bill for specific execution of a contract is not entertained in equity
as a matter of right, but is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.
Case in which, in the exercise of this judicial discretion, the prayer for
specific execution -was denied. Id.
3. A bill is brought for specific execution of a contract of sale of real
estate between the ancestor of the plaintiffs and the defendant: a written
contract of sale between the parties, and a receipt executed by the vendor
to the vended acknowledging the payment of a large portion of thp purchase money, are produced by the plaintiffs and filed as exhibits with their
bill: nodiscovery is sought by the bill of the genuineness of the contract
and receipt, or of the fact whether the money -was paid or not: the answer admits the execution of both by the defendant, but denies that the
money was in fact paid, as stated in the receipt, and other evidence exists
in the cause tending to show that the money was not paid: Held, 1. That
the answer, not being responsive to the bill, was not evidence that could
avail the respondent. 2. That as there was other evidence in the cause
tending to repel the presumption of payment arising from the execution of
the receipt, it was proper to direct an issue to be tried by a jury, to deter mine whether the money had been in truth paid, or no. Id.
4. A mere creditor at large will not be entertained in equity, to enable
him to reach the equitable estate of his debtor. He must obtain a judgment at law, binding the real eitate of his debtor, before he can come
into equity. The judgment lien is the necessary foundation for the equitable jurisdiction and equity lends its aid to make that lien effectual whenever it cannot be enforced by execution at law. Id.
ERROR.
See Appeal.
In a proper case, a cause may be heard on error or appeal in a different
district from that in -which it originated. Hazen vs. Commonwealth.
654
EVIDENCE.
See Self-Defence.
1. That the former declarations of a witness -whose credibility is attacked, may be given-in evidence to corroborate his testimony in certain
cases, is well settled, though whether they a;e admissible in all cases, the
authorities are conflicting, and the question is here expressly, waived.
Held, that evidence, showing that a confederate of the prisoner and the
pisoner had money in their possession immediately after the murder,
similar to the money, both in amount and description, known to have
been in possession of the murdered man, coupled with the fact that both
the prisoner and his confederate were destitute of money prior to the murder, is admissible. Gates vs. The People.
671
2. The testimony of a person examined as a witness before a coroner's
jury, such person not being at the time under arrest, or charged with
crime, may b6 given in evidence against him, on his subsequent trial for
the alleged murder of the deceased. Hendrickson vs. The People.
- 531
3. The witness in such case, stands on the same footing as the witness
examined on the trials of issues. He is not bound to criminate himself,
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and may decline to answer as to whatever tends to do so; but if he fail to
avail himself of his privilege, his answers will be deemed voluntary, and
may be given in evidence against him. It is only when he is compelled to
answer, after having declined to do so, that the answer will be deemed
compulsory and will be excluded. Id.
4. On the trial of a prisoner for the murder of his wife, the prosecution
was permitted to introduce in evidence, the will of the father of the deceased, by which it appeared that the testator devised all his property to
his wife.for life, and after her death, to his three children; the son to take
one half, and the deceased and her sister, each one fourth; held, that such
evidence was properly admitted, as bearing upon the question of motive. Id.
EXECUTORY CONTRXCT.
In ordinary cases the non-payment of money by a stipulated day is not
sufficient of itself to defeat the claim of a party to specific execution, since
interest will usually compensate the party for the delay, and equity relieves from forfeitures whenever it can make compensation. But when the
parties enter into an executory contract of sale whereby it is stipulated,
that if the vendor did not pay the purchase money within a prescribed period, the contract should be null and void, they have chosen to make time
of the essence of their contract in express terms, and even partial payments made within the period, will not entitle the vendor to demand a decree for specific execution. To decree specific execution, under such circumstances, would, in trath, be not the enforcement of the contract between the parties, but the assumption of authority by a Court of Equity to
make a contract for the parties which they had not made for themselves.
The Court should treat the contract as rescinded and require the vendor
to refund so much of the purchase money as has been paid by the vendee.
Especially should specific Vxecution be refused when the bill was brought
after a great lapse of time which wrought great changes in the relations of
the parties and in the subject of the contract. Vint vs. King.
- 712
FENCE.
1. -At common law the owner of a close was not obliged to fence against
the cattle of the occupant of an adjoining dcose. The statute imposing the
duty on adjoining proprietors of land to erect afid maintain fences, recognized the same principle; for the object and design of fencing is not to
keep the cattle -of others off the premises, but to keep at home the cattle
of the occupant. This principle has equal application to the owners of
land adjoining public highways; and where no statutes exist, and no obligation is imposed by covenant or prescription, a Railroad Company is not
bound to fence their land. Hurd vs. The Rutland Railroad. - 232
2. Under the provisions of section fourteen of the Act incorporating the
Rutland and Burlington Railroad Company, requiring them "to build and
maintain a sufficient fence upon each side of their road through the whole
route thereof," if the cattle of the owners of adjacent land are found upon
the road, and are injured through the negligence of the corporation to
make and maintain a sufficient fence, the corporation are chargeable with
the risk, and are subject to such damages as may be sustained thereby. Id.
3. And where a farm-crossing is constructed over the railroad for the
benefit of an adjacent land owner, it is the duty of the corporation, under
the statute, to guard it by a continuous fence, and to erect suitable bars or
gates, in order to give convenient access to it; and if injury arise through
the want of such bars or gates, the corporation will be liable, unless some
facts exist, by which they are relieved from the responsibility. Id.
4. If the land owner refuse to have bars placed at such crossing, and forbid the corporation to make them then they offered to do so, or were in
the act of erecting them, this, as against such land owner, would operate
as a legal excuse for their omission to build the fence, even if an express
agreement had been made by the parties for the erection of gates, histead
of bars. For the non-performance of the agreement, and the refusal to
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erect gates, as stipulated, the remedy of the party would be only by action
on the contract for damages. And the effect of the refusal to have bars
erected would be to replace upon the land ower the obligation which vested
upon him at common law, to keep his cattle on his own premises, and from
the premises and railway of the corporation.
rd
FOREIGN ATTACHMENT.
See Lien-Ship.
1. Where several foreign attachments are executed the same day and
upon the same property, but at different hours of the day, the money made
from the sale of the property should be applied to the payment of the judgments obtained upon them in the order of their service.-Thefirst ezeauted
- 253
should befirstpaid. Case vs. Case.
2. Where several foreign attachments are simultaneously executed upon
the same property, the judgments obtained upon them should be paid pro
rata. Id.
3. Where several foreign attachments are executed the same day and
upon the same property, and each of the writs shows the same return, the
sheriff who. made the service is a competent witness for the purpose of
proving that they were executed at different hours of the day. Id.
FRANCHISE.
See Constitutional Law-Corporation-Plea-Way.
FUGITIVE SLAVE.
See Action.
I. The mIaster of a fugitive slave, having him apprehended by the marshal, in pursuance of a warrant, cannot be arrested for assault and battery committed on such fugitive, while making the arrest, in aid and at the
requestrof the marshal, before the final hearing and order of the judge.
U. S. vs. Morris.
.
.
.
.
. 348
2. A warrant for the apprehension of a fugitive slave is in full force until
the final hearing and -order; and after a rescue, a fresh pursuit may be
made by the marshal and owner, with the same warrant. Id.
8. The service of process under the United States cannot be interrupted
by the arrest of the officer or person aiding him in serving such process;
or in any other manner, by means of State process or warrants. Id.
GRAND JURY.
See Neutrality Laws.
HABEAS CORPUS.
1. The refusal of a writ of habeas corpus by one Court, isno bar to an
application to another Court. Alexander, ex parte,
- 44
2. A Court can, on habeas corpus, deliver a party from imprisonment for
a contempt of Court, where the Court committing the party has transcended its authority by excess of punishment, or by a punishment unknown to
the law. But the question of contempt, if the Court had authority over it,
will not be inquired into oi habeas corpus; nor will a writ of error lie in
such case; for every Cour.t must be sole judge of the contempts against
itself. Id.
3. Under the Act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1833, ch. 57, sect. 7,
(commonly called the Fore Bill,) any Judge of the Supreme br District
Court of the United States, has authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus,
where a prisoner in jail or confinement, has been committed o7 confined,
"on or by any authority or law, for any act done, or omitted to be done,
in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree
of any Judge or Court thereof. Jenkins, ex party,
- 144
4. A petition for a habeas corpus by two deputies of the marshal of the
United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, set forth that a
warrant, under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, duly issued by a Commissioner, having been placed in their hands, they were resisted in its execution by the prisoner, who succeeded in escaping; and that they were subsequently arrested, and imprisoned under color of a warrant from a Justice
of the Peace, in the State of Pennsylvania, charging them with an assault
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and battery, with an intent to kill, upon the fugitive; and prayed their
discharge. The return to the writ merely set forth the warrant of the
Justice, duly granted upon oath : Held, that the writ was properly allowed
under the Act of 1833; that evidence was admissible on the part of the
relators, to show the true state of the facts, notwithstanding the return;
and that such evidence, showing that the violence alleged, if any used, was
in discharge of the prisoner's duty, under a law of the United States, they
must be discharged. Id.
5. On a hearing on a, habeas corpu, under the Act of 1833, the State,
by virtue of whose laws the arrest was made, is the only party entitled to
be represented by counsel. Neither the prosecutor nor the officer making
the arrest, have a right to be heard. Id.
6. The benefit of 31 Charles II, ch. 2, (the Habeas Corpus Act) secured
to inhabitants of Maryland, by article 3d of Bill of Rights. In re Walsh, 542
7. Act of 1809, ch. 125, sec. 2, declares that application for Habeas
Corpus may be made "to the Chancellor, or any Judge of the Court of
Appeals, or of the County Courts in vacation time." Held, that this Act
applies to the Judges of the existing Court of Appeals. Id.
8. The 4th article of the new Constitution, sect. 2, provides, "That the
Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction only, and the jurisdiction
which the present Court of Appeals now has, &c." Held, That this section
does not abrogate the second section of Act of 1809, ch. 125. Quiere, Can
the Court of Appeals, when in session, in Term time grant a Habeas
Corpus? Id.
9. Held, That the Act of 1853, ch. 238, confers upon the Circuit Courts
and their Judges, such power only as the County Courts or the Court of
Chancery, while in session in term time could have and exercise, and that
in this particular it does not in effect repeal the Act of 1809. Id.
10. Hed, That no individual Judge of the Court of Appeals, during the
term time of the Court, has jurisdiction to grant the writ of Habeas Corpus,
that jurisdiction being expressly limited to vacation time. Also, that if this
application had been made in vacation time, the writ would unhesitatingly
have been granted. Id.
HOUSE.
See Mutual Support.
HOMICIDE.
See Self-Defence.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See Married Woman's Act-Indictment.
By the law of Mississsippi, the rights of the husband rest on the same
foundation as a title acquired by purchase, and for their extent Courts will
- 604
not look beyond the contract of marridge. Lyon vs. Knott,
IDENTITY.
In an action on a note, the. execution of which was admitted, but the
statute of limitations pleaded, the plaintiff called one who testified that,
acting as his attorney, he had addressed a letter through the post-office to
the defendant (with whom the witness was not personally acquainted), on
the subject of the claim, to which he duly received a reply; and that
shortly afar this, a person called at his office, who introduced himself as
the defenffant, and in conversation, made such a promise as would have
taken the case out of the statute. The defendant's name was an unusual
one, and no attemptwas made to show a false personation. Held, sufficient
prima facie proof of identity, to allow the evidence to go to the jury. Kelly
499
vs. Valney,
INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION.
See Contradt.
INDICTMENT.
See Conspiracy.
Delivery by the wife of her husband's goods to her adulterer, he having
knowledge that she had taken them without her husband's authority, is
sufficient to support an indictment for larceny against the-adulterer. Reg.
vs. Featherstone,

-
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LNJUNCTION.
See Laches. Lis pendens.
INSURANCE.
1. To an action on a policy of insurance on life, which contained a proviso
that if the assured should "die by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel,
or by the hands of justice, or in tha known violation of any law of the State,
or of the United States," the defendants pleaded that the deceased committed suicide-by drowning himsdf, and so died by his own hand. Replication, that at the time the deceased so committed suicide, &c., he was of
unsound mind and wholly unconcious of the act. Held good. Breasted vs.
The Farmers' Loan Company,
- 358
2. Insurance on "the stock of a pork-house," made in the name of the
owners of the establishment, includes the pork, &c., of others, which is
there on commission, although in the printed conditions of the policy it is
stated that "goods held in trust or on commission, are to be insured as
such, otherwise the policy will not cover such property." Jackson vs. The
Ins. Co.,
.
.
.
.
. 374
3. If that condition is substantially complied with, that is sufficient. Id.
4. A contract to sell a part of the pork, the absolute property of the
owners of the pork-house, and the weighing off the same, inspected by the
inspector of the vendees, separated the property from the stock, and it was
no longer included in the policy, although the vendors were; by a separate
contract, to smoke it at the establishment. Id.
5. In an action on a policy of insurance, it appeared that the goods
insured contained in 36 bales and cases, had arrived at their port of destination, and had been subsequently destroyed by fire in the warehouse of
the consignee, before inspection, with the exception of two cases. The
goods contained in one of the latter, of a delicate fabric, WQe injured
apparently by salt water, and there was stight evidence that it exhibited
on the outside stains of salt-water; which stains were proved also to have
been on some of the other packages before the fire; the remaining case
was also damaged. The vessel, however, was sound and seaworthy at tfie
end of the voyage; the rest of the cargo uninjured; there was no violent
storm during the voyage. The goods also were of various descriptions, and
differently packed. Held,'That there was no evidence to go to the jury, of
a loss by the perils of the sea, at least as to thirty-four packages. Levy
vs. The Ins. Co
.
.
.
.
. 297
JUDGE.
See Contempt. Habeas Corpus. Trial by JuryJUROR.
A juror ought to stand indifferent between the prosecution and the accused, and where a juror was challenged on his statement on oath that no
degree of circumstantial-evidence would induce him to render a verdict of
guilty against the prisoner charged with a capital offence; Hdd, That the
challenge was properly allowed. Also, that a challenge was properly
pdlowed, when a juror stated on oath that he should be very reluctant to
render a verdict of guiilty, even if his judgment was convinced of the prisoner's guilt; but he did not know but that he might be starved to render
it. Gates vs. The People,
- 671
JUSTIFICATION.
See De Injuria.
LACHES.
The trustee of an insolvent debtor was appointed in 1837. In 1843 the
debtor died, and his executor proceeded immediately to collect and administer his estate according to law, became involved in law suits, settled an
administration account, and was decreed to distribute the balance in 1851,
having, in the settlement of the estate, incurred heavy expenses, and expended much time and labor. The insolvent trustee had in nowise acted,
except by giving security, in 1848, till 1851, when he instituted an action
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against the executor, to recover the principal portion of the assets, on the
ground that it had formed part of the decedent's estate at the timelof his
insolvent discharge, but had been fraudulently concealed. The trustee, as
well as the creditors whom he represented, had been aware of the proceedings of the executor during the whole period, but no notice had been given of any intended suit, nor any proceeding commenced. The trustee was
restrained by injunction, on bill filed by the executor, from further proceeding in his action, on the ground of laches. Frevali vs. Barclay.
- 172
LEGACY.
See Will.
A legacy may be made of property in Louisiana, to a corporation existing in and created- by the laws of another State.
MoDonough's Ex'rs,
v.

Murdock

.

.

..

401

LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS.
1. The contract of marriage is not made an exception to the well-settled
rule of the common law, that the law of the place where contracts are entered into, unless made with a view to performance in another place, is to
determine the relative rights and obligations of the parties. Lyon vs.
Knott.

-

-

606

2. Where there is no express contract, the law of the matrimonial domioil will govern as to all the rights of the parties to their present property
in that place, and as to all personal property everywhere, and the same
rule holds good as well to future acquisitions as to present property, when
there is no change of domicil; but when there is such change, the law of
the actual, and not of the matrimonial domicil will prevail as to future acquisition of movable property. Id.
LIABILITY (F SHIP OWNER.
See Ship Owner.
LIBEL.-See Ship.
LIENS.-See Ship.
1. .A sale under foreign attachment, or similar, proceeding in a State
Court, though it transfers the title of the defendant to the property attached, does not affect liens created thereon by-the law of another State.
Devinney vs. The Memphis.
666
2. Supplies were furnished to a steamboat in Kentucky, the debt for
which became thereupon, by the law of that State, a preferred lien, enforceable against a purchaser without notice, during the space of one year.
The vessel was subsequently attached in Louisiana by process out of a
State Court, and judgments were rendered against her master and owners,
on confession of the master (the owners not having been served with process), "with privilege in the property therein provisionally.seized," under
which she was sold. Held, that this sale did not affect the lien for supplies
in Kentucky, and was no bar to a suit thereon, within the statutory limitation. Id.
LIFE INSURANCE.
See Insurance.
LIS PENDENS.
1. The doctrine of lispendens does not apply to negotiable paper. Winston vs. Westfeldt.

2. An injunction in force against the negotiation of a note, does not
destroy its negotiability. Id.
3. An endorsee who acquires a negotiable note before maturity, bona
fde, and for ialuable consideration, ,ithout notice, is not bound by a decree in a chancery suit to 'which his endorser was a party, although he acquired the note after the rendition of the.decree. .d.
LOCAL LEGISLATION.
See Constitutional Law.
MAINE LIQUOR LAW.
See Constitutional Law.
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MARRIED WOMAN'S ACT.
See Husband and Wife-Trustee.
1. In an action for certain horses sold and delivered, it appeared that the
defendant's wife had bought the goods, and given her own note for them;
and that she had previously, and generally acted as his agent; and that he
made no objection to the purchase, but had used the horses as his own;
held, that there was evidence to go to the jury, of the husband's liability,
notwithstanding the Married Woman's Acts of New York. Gates vs.
Brower.

283

2. The statute of Mississippi of 1839, which secures to a married woman
certain property in her own right, is a limitation of the marital rights of
the husband, as they existed at common law, but does not restrict such
rights beyond the express and positive language of the act, or by necessary implication therefrom. Lyon vs. Knott.
606
3." The future right of the husband to the property is a right incident to
the contract of marriage, as regulated by law; the husband does not succeed to the slaves of th6 wife, held by her under the statute, as an inheritor or distributee of her separate estate, but they vest in him under the law,
and by virtue of the contract of marriage. Id.
MARYLAND.-Constitution, Art. 4, s. 2; Act of 1809, ch. 125, sect. 2;
Act of 1853, ch. 238, construction of, in re Walsh. 542
MASSACHUSETTS.
See Constitutional Law.
MASTER IN EQUITY.
1. A mister in equity, in whose name assets are invested, has no authority to negotiate or transfer any of the securities therefor, which are in his
possession or under his control, or to change the investment, without a
special order of the Court. Sinons vs. South Western Bank. - 546
2. A master in equity is a mere depositary, and not a technical trustee. Id.
MISUSER.
See Non-User.
MORTGAGE.
1. A mortgage given to secure a debt then due and payable-may be redeemed or foreclosed at any time. Wright vs. Shumway.
20
2. A covenant on the part of a settler upon unsurveyed lands of the
United States to purchase those lands as soon as they are surveyed and offered for sale by the Government, and then mortgage them to a creditor
for the security of a debt, is not a contract in violation of Sections 4 and
5 of an Act of Congress, entitled "An Act for the relief of the purchasers
of public lands, and for the suppression of fraudulent practices at the public sales of the land of the United States." [4 U. S. Statutes at Large,
890.1 Id.
8. An equitable mortgage springs from an agreement that there shall be
a lien. A covenant, by a debtor with his creditor, to purchase certain
lands therein described, and to mortgage them to said creditor as a security for a debt, is an equitable mortgage, and will be enforced in equity by
a decree of sale of the premises, in pursuance of a prayer of a bill for
that purpose. Id.
4. Where a settler on public lands, entitled to a pre-emption, procures a
capitalist to pay the purchase money inth the land office, and allows him to
take the receiver's receipt in his own name, or makes an assignment to him
of his certificates of location as his security for such payment, upon receiving back a bond for a deed upon repaying on a certain day the said
purchase'money with interest, and the annual taxes on the land; this is,
in equity, a mortgage of the premises, redeemable by the settler or his
assigns, at or before the time the said money becomes payable, according
to the conditions of the bond. Id.
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MUTUAL SUPPORT, RIGHT OF.
1. When a number of houses are built together on a spot of ground, in
such a manner as to require the mutual support of each other, for the purpose of their common protection and security, ana the owner afterwards
parts with the possession, either at one time or both together, and the property is afterwards subdivided, the right of mutual support remains. Richardson vs. Rose.

-

-

-

-

178

2. Semble, per Parke, B., that this does not deprive the occupier of any
of the houses of the right of making a drain to his house. Id.
NAVIGATION.
Vessels have a right to use a warp in getting in and out of the harbor of
a navigable river, and to extend the warp across the entire channel; but
on the approach of another vessel, it is the duty of the vessel using the
warp to take notice of such approach, and so to lower the warp as to give
a free passage through the ordinary traveled part of the channel, and to
indicate to the approaching vessel the point intended for her passage. The
approaching party is not bound to pass at the point indicated, but may pass
at a different point if he honestly thinks it can be done without interference,
but in such case he will be liable for the damage which ensues, unless he
can prove that he disregarded the notice of the other vessel in the bona
fide belief that he could so pass without damage to it, and the burthen of
- 678
proving this will be upon him. Potter vs. Pettis,
NEW YORK.
See Married Woman's Act.
NEXT OF KIN.
See Alien.
NEUTRALITY LAWS.
1. A Judge of the United States has power, on just grounds of suspicion,
to require bond to observe the Neutrality Laws. United States vs.
. 645
..
...
.
Quitman,
1. A Grand Jury charged with inquiring as to the existence of an organization whose object was the invasion of the territory of a friendly Power,
presented that the principal witnesses examined before them, and who were
rumored to be the leaders in the unlawful enterprise, had refused to answer
questions propounded to them on the subject, on the ground that it would
criminate themselves. The Grand Jury also presented that, though they
were unable to elicit any facts on which to base an indictment, or to show
the existence of any actual military organization, yet that they believed
that some such organization was in contemplation. Held, That there were
suffcient grounds for requiring from the parties who declined to testify
before the Grand Jury, bonds to observe the Neutrality Laws of the United
States. Id.
NON-USER.
Advantage cannot be taken of non-user or misuser of an act of incorporation in any collateral action. Union Branch R. R. vs. East Tenn. and
Georgia R. R.,

.

.

...

. 808

PARTITION.
1. Ordinarily, an application to a Court of equity for partition, is not an
appeal to the sound discretion of the Court, to be granted or refused
according to the circumstances of the case, as in cases of specific execution
and other cases, but the right to demand partition is cz debto jutitce, if
- 712
the'complainant can show a clear legal title. Vint vs. King's Heirs,
2. The bill for partition is a substitute for the.now obsolete remedy by
writ of partition in the law courts, pnd Courts of equity, in their proceedings on these bills as ih other cases of concurrent jurisdiction, give the
same relief that was formerly afforded in the courtp of law by writ of
partition. Questions of fraud were not iognizable in these latter tribunals
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where a party brought his writ of partition and the same rule obtains in
equity courts whenever the plaintiff had his election to proceed either at
law, or in equity. But where complainant in eqqity stands upon a purely
equitable title, of which courts of law will not take cognizance at all,
the
jurisdiction of equity is exclusive, and courts of equity are left free to adopt
our cherished principles, and to apply their power to detect and eviscerate
latent frauds and concealments which the process of a court of law is not
adapted to reach, and to relieve against them. Id.
3. It seems, that even where a plaintiff in equity seeking partition, shows
a clear legal title, if the defendant files a cross-bill alleging fraud in the
procurement of his conveyance by the plaintiff in the original bill, who,
instead of demurring to the cross-bill, answers and denies the fraud, and
depositions are taken on each side to establish and repel the imputation of
fraud respectively, it is too late at the trial, for the original plaintiff, to
object that equity has no jurisdiction to examine questions of fraud on bills
for partition. The cross-bill, filed by the defendant against aplaintiff is,
to some extent, a substitute for an independent and original .bil: and as,
after a decree for partition in favor of a plaintiff showing a clear legal title,
the defendant would doubtless be entitled to relief in equity by a new bill
impeaching the plaintiff's title, on the ground of 'fraud, no reason is perceived why the same measure of relief should not be applied in favor of the
plaintiff in the cross-bill, the defendant having waived his right to object
to the jurisdiction of equity to take cognizance of questions of fraud in such
cases. Fraud is never presumed by the law: it must always be proved;,
and the onus is upon the party alleging it. Id.
4. It is believed that, both in England and in this coujitry, a right to
partition is incident to all real estate held in joint tenancy, or tenancy in
common. Wood vs. Little,
"'
. -53;
9-...
6. Upon a division, it is not necessary that the parts be made equal in
size or value, inasmuch as the party whose share is less in .value may be
compensated in money, under the award of the commissioners.
d.
6. It is not a valid objection to a petition for partition, that the principal
part of the estate (as for instance a cotton factory) is not divisible into the
parts prayed for, without destroying it for the purposes for which it had
been erected and maintained, provided the division would not destroy it fonother purposes. Id.
PASSENGER ACT.
See Cohistruction.
1. The limitation of two passengers for every five tons of a-vessel'smes-.
surement, by the 1st and 2d sections of the Passenger Act of 1819, has.
been repealed by the 10th section of -the Act of 1849. United States-vs.
The Anna, "
- 42=
2. No conviction can be had under the Passenger Act of 1847, except
where an illegal number of passengers has been taken onboard at a foreign
port, with the intention to bring them into- the United States, aid where
such illegal number has actually been brought in; or where an illegal liumber
has been taken on board at a port in the United States, with the intention,
to transport them to a.foreign port. The mere intention to violate the law,.formed in a foreign country, and not completed by the illegal importation, .
is insufficient. Id.
3. In the determination of the liability of a vessel, under the Passenger
Act of 1847, the Court will be guided by her custom-house measurement;
which has been delivered by the Surveyor of the port to the *master or
owner of the vessel, in preference to any subsequent measurement on the
part of the Government. Id.
4. The term "personal luggage," in the Act of 1847, only in-eludes
wearing apparel, bed and bedding of the passengers, required for-their
comfort and convenience of the voyage, and does not extend to furniture,
stores, or other articles not necessary for their personal convenience.' Ad:.
5. The principles by which the Court will be guided in the deterimination
of the cases under the Passenger Act of 1847. Id.

50
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PATENT.
1. The inventor of an unpatented medicine has no exclusive right to
make and vend the same; but, if others make and vend it, they have no
right to vend it as the manufacture of the inventor, nor to adopt his label
or trade-mark, nor one so like it as to lead the public to suppose the article
to which it is affixed is the manufacture of the inventor, and they are
equally liable for the damage whether such trade-mark be adopted by fraud
or mistake.

Davis vs. Kendall,

.

.

.

.

. 681

2. The plaintiff, having irst applied the name ,"Pain-Killer" to a medical compound made and sold by himself, it was held that the application
of the same name to a similar compound, sold by the defendant, bottled
and labelled in a somewhat similar way, was an infringement of the plaintiff's trade-mark. - Id.
PENALTY.
See Conspiracy. Passenger Act.
PENNSYLVANIA.
Construction of Act of 7th April, 1849, Plank Rbad Law in Beardsley
vs. Honesdale Plank Road Co.
. 654
..
Act of 1850, Small Note Law in Hazen vs. Com., .
-PERILS OF THE SEA.
See Insuranice.
PLEA.
A plea which sets forth the character and terms of an Act of the Legislature, granting a franchise, and material to the defendast's case, which
Act is alluded to in the bill only as "a pretended legislative grant," performs the proper office of a plea, by bringing forward matter not distinctly
appearing in the bill, and which displaces the equity. Unon Branch R. R.
803
..
.
vs. East Tenn. & Georgia R. R., PRE-EMPTION.
See Mortgage.
PRISONERS, ANSWERS BY.
See Evidence.
PRIVILEGE.
See Evidence.
PROCEEDINGS IN REM.
Proceedings in rem by a foreign Court, except a Court of Admiralty, or
one exercising a similar jurisdiction in the case of seizures, are not binding
on the rights of persons not parties thereto. Deviney vs. The Memphis, 666
PROCESS.
See Fugitive Slave.
PROMISSORY NOTE.
See Bill of Exchange.
1. The removal of the maker and indorser of a promissory note into
another jurisdiction after the execution of the instrument will dispense
with the necessity of presentment and notice of non-payment. Becker vs.
Levy,

2. It seems, that the indorsement of a note by one not a party to it, in
the absence of evidence of any particular intention, authorizes the payee to
write over his name any form of engagement he may see proper. Id.
PUBLIC DEBT.
See Constitutional Law.
PUBLIC LANDS.
See Mortgage.
RAILROAD.
See Eminent Domain. Fence. Franchise.
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RECEIPT.
A rec4t is pHma fade evidence that the sum of money expressed in it,
was paid according to its tenor. Vint vs. Heirs of King,
- 712
REMAINDER.
. The uncertainty whether a remainder will ever take effect in possession, will not prevent it from being a vested remainder, provided the interest
be fixed, It is the present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the
possession were to become vacant, which distinguishes a vested from a
contingent remainder Therefore, though children may be born of the
marriage, or the wife may survive the husband, yet the right of the husband
to the slaves of the wife, under the statute, is vested by the marriage, as
he is from that fime clothed with a present capacity of taking, though his
right may be defeated or intercepted by events subsequently occurring.
Lyon vs. Knott,
.604
2. In limitation of kegal estates where a remainder of inheritance'is
limited in contingency, by way of use or by devise, the inheritance in the
meantime, if not otherwise disposed of, remains in the grantor And his
heirs, or in the heirs of the testator, until the contingency happens to take
it out of them: and equity herein follows the law. Vint'vs. Heirs of King, 712
REPEAL.
See Way.
An act of incorporation, in which the Legislature have reserved the right.
of repeal may be repealed by implication, upon the principle that every
affirmative statute is a repeal by implication of a precedent affirmative
statute, so far-asitis contrary thereto. Union Branch R. R. vs. Eaut Tenn.
& Georgia 1R.R.,
""
- 803
SEAMEN'S WAGES.
See Ship.
SEAWORTHINESS.
See Warranty.
'SELF-DEFENCE.
See Threats.
SETTLER ON PUBLIC LANDS.
See Mortgage.
SHELLEY'S CASE, RULE-IN.
See Trust--Trustee.
SHIP.
I1.
A vessel may be libelled and sold in a Court of Admiralty, under a
paramount lien, such as for seamen's wages, notwithstanding that she has
been previously seized by process-of foreign attachment issuing out of a
State Court, and still remains in the custody of the Sheriff; and a perfect
title will pass to the Marshal's vendee. Wall vs. The Royal Saxon,
- 324
2. A vessel seized, under process of foreign attachment in a State Court,
was subsequently libelled in Admiralty for seamen's wages, and attached
by the Marshal, whild still in the custody of the Sheriff. The .vessel was,
sold as perishable in both-proceedings. Ruled, that as the common law
jurisdiction had first attached, the title of the Sheriff's vendee was superior
to that of the vendee of the Marshal. Carryl vs. Taylor,
.- 833
3. It seems that maritime liens, such as for seamen's wages, are discharged by a sale on execution in Pennsylvania, and that the olaimants are
turned over to the fund in the hands of the Sheriff. Ad.
SHIP-OWNER.
See Construction.
1. The 2d Section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, "To limit
the liability of. ship-owners," &c., does not make the absence of the 'note
in writing,' required by the statute, a discharge of the ship-owner's liability on a contract of affreightment, where the true character and value of
the enumerated articles have been fairly and clearly set down in the Bill
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of Lading, whether before or after the actual shipment; nor, it seems,
where such character and value kwere in fact unknown to the parties.
Watson vs. Marks,

--

- 157

-

2. Under the Section of this Act, the personal liability of the shipowners on a contract of affreightment, ceases upon a total destruction of
the vessel and loss of freight, before the completion of her voyage, though
the actual damage to, or loss of the goods to be carried, as in the case of
theft, has taken place prior to the time of the destruction of the vessel. Id.
3. The limitation of liability of the ship-owner, by this section, is not
affected by the fact that the vessel has been insured, and the insurance has
been paid or become pay able. Id.
SLAVE.
See Action.
SPECIAL PLEADING.
Special ileading before a Justice of the Peace, though not to be encouraged, is not unlawful, and when a defendant has pleaded specially, and the
plaintiff demurs to his plea, the facts therein alleged are regularly on the
record, and become substantive ground of the judgment. Commonwealth
vs. Johnston,

-

-

-

-

285, 517

STOCK
See Trust..
SUNDAY.
1. In a conviction under the Act of 22d April, 1794, for performing
worldly employment on Sunday, it should appear what the vork was for
which the defendant was convicted, but as the whole record is to be taken
together, it is sufficient if the description of the work appear in any part
of it.

Commonwealth vs. Johnston.

- 285, 517

-

2. Driving an omnibus as a public conveyance daily and every day, is
worldly employment, and not a work of charity or necessity within the
meaning of the Act of '94, and therefore not lawful on Sunday. Id.
3. A contract of hiring by the month does not, in general, bind the hireling to work on Sundays, and if his work be such as the Statute forbids,
an express agreement to perform it on Sunday will not protect him, for
such a contract is void. Id.
4. Though travelling does not in a legal sense fall within the description
of worldly employment intended to be prohibited, yet the running of
public conveyances on Sunday is forbidden by the Statute. Id.
THREATS.
1. Previous threats, unconnected with any manifestation at the time of
the killing, of an intention to carry them into immediate execution, Will
not extenuate the crime of a deliberate homicide committed in cold blood
by one laying in wait purposely to take the life of his adversary, even if
the motive which actuated the slayer was the preservation of his own life
from apprehended violence from the deceased; but such killing is murder
in the first degree.

Lander vs. The State,

-

-

- 755

3. The rule as to self-defence in 2 Stark. Ev. 721, 1 Russ. on Crimes,
661, Whart. Am. Crim. Lawi 254, 1st ed., 885, 2d ed., stated and shown to
be the true rule. Id.
TRANSLATION.
. See Copyright.
TRIAL BY JURY.
1. The great principle, of the trial by juryis, that the Court shall determine the law, and the jury the facts. Guffyvs. Commonwealth,
- 242
2. Even in criminal cases, where the jury have a right to determine both
the law and the fact, they are to do so (with the single exception of an
acquittal,) "under the direction of the Oourt." I4
3. The necessity of guarding the liberties of the people against the
power of the government, has established the principle that the Court'can-
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not deprive the defendant in a criminal case" of the benefit of a verdict of
acguittaz. Id.
4. In alL other cases, civil and criminal, the supeivision of the Court in
directing the admission or.ieJectionof. vidence, in giving instructions to
the jurors on matters of law, and in settig aside a verdict where it is con,
trary to law or evidence, is an essential element in the trial by jury. Id.
5. Where there is nothing In the testimony to show that the protecutor
in a criminal case behaved improperly, the Court may set aside so miuch
of the verdict as directs him'to pay the costs, without disturbing the v~edipt
of acquittal, and such decision is not the subject of review on writ of
error. Id.
TRUST.
1. Conveyance by N. D. to H. F. in trust to have and to hold the premises
"unto the said.y. F. and his heirs, to the use of the said H. F. and his 'he&s, in
trust nevertheless for the sole, separate and only use of S. D. (wife of the
grantor), during the term of her natural life; so tha the same shall in no
manner be liable to my debts, contracts or engagements; and .after lir
death, should the saidl S. D. survive me, the said N. D,, and'quiy in that
event, then in trust to and for the right heirs of hdr the said S. D., their
heirs and assfyns forevn." S. D. survived her husband. H4,, That the
statute had not executed any of the uses; that the rble in Shelley's case
applied, and that S. 'D. had, an equitable fee. Dauner:s. Tiescott, ,
- 366
2. A purchaser of stodk from a trustee, with notice of the eitencoe of
a trust, as *here it appears on the face of the certificate, takes it, subject
to all equities attaching thfi'eto. Simons vs. The South Westeru Bank1 - 546
3. The resulting trust remaining in the heirs at law of the t4stator, was
not a merepossibility, incapable of being granted, assigned or devised, but
an equitable estate perfectly capable of such transfer. This r~sulting trust,
the creature of' equity, had its existence at the moment of the testator's
death. It d&scended to his heirs at law, subject to be divested whenever
the express trust created by the will became vested, and did riot remain in
abeyance, until the condition on which the express trust was to vest, became impossible. Therefore, from the moment of the testator's death, his
heirs at law had a defedsible and conditional estate cast uipon them by the
law, which they might as effectually alien, as if it had been indefeasible
and unconditional, and legal as well as equitable. Vint vs. King,
712
TRUSTEE.
See Laches.
1. A trustee will not be permitted to carry on unnecessary litigation to
the injury of a third person, merelyfor the purpose of earning cgmmissns. Frevall vs. Barclay,
- 172
2. In cases of devises or conveyances to -trustees for the separate use of
married wohin, the Court will, if possible, so construe them as to vest
the legal estate in the trustees, because this will best effectuate the intention of the 'donor. Ware vs. Richardson, - 485
3. A dded conveyed real estate to a trustee" in trust," that a married
woman "shall and may, iuring her life, have, hold, use, occupy and enjoy"
the same, "and the rents, issues, and profits thereof," ,"to her own proper
use and benefit notiithstanding her coverture; and that without the let,
trouble or control of her present or any future husband," or being liable
for his debts, "as fully in every respect as if she was sole and unmarried,
and from and immidiately after her death, then to and for the use and
benefit of her legal heirs and representatives." Held: That this deed created
but a mere equitable life estate in the married woman, and that it executed the.legal estate in her heirs and, consequently that the rule in Shelley's case did not apply. Id.
USAGE.
1. A commission merchant in New York receiving a parcel of corn, with
orders to sell. for cash, sold it to a person, at the time of sale, in good
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credit. The sale was made on Monday, and the price was called for on
the succeeding Friday, but not paid. On the next Monday, it became
known that the purchaser had failed. The loss was held to fall on the
commission merchant, notwithstanding an attempt was made to set up a
usage in New York that where a sale is made for cash, the purchaser has
three or four days to pay the money. Mettler & Stewart vs. Scudder,
- 80
2. A usage to control or interpret contracts, must be known, certain,
uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to law. Id.
3. Semble.-That such usage as was set up in this case was unreasonable
and illlegaL Id.
VERDICT.
See Trial by Jury.
WARRANT.
See Fugitive Slave.
WARRANTY.
1. There is no Implied warranty of seaworthiness in a contract between
the owner of a ship and a seaman to serve on board of it for a particular
voyage. Therefore, a declaration by a seaman against the owner of a ship
for so negligently fitting out the ship, that by reason thereof it Vas unseaworthy, and plaintiff was unable to sleep in his hainmock, and obliged to
undergo excessive labor, and was thereby injured in his health, pot alleging
any knowledge of the unseaworthiness, or any personal blame on the part
bf the defendant, cannot be supported. Couch vs. Steel,
- .
- 685
2. By sect. 18 of stat. 7 & 8 Viet. c.112, every ship navigating between
the United Kingdom and any place out of the same, shall keep constantly
on-board a sufficient stipply of medicines, suitable to accidents and diseases
arising on Bea voyages, and the owner of the ship ghall incur a penalty of
201. for every default By sect. 62, all penalties shall be recovered either
in the Superior Courts at the suit of the Attorney-General, or at the suit of
any person by summary proceeding and not exceeding one moiety shall be
paid'to the informer, and the residue to the Seamen's Hospital Society:
Held, that the penalty was -recoverable for a breach of thke -public duty
created by the statute, and that the common law right to maintain an
action in respect of a special damage resulting from the brpach of that.
duty, was not taken away. Id.
WAY.
1. Upon a trial of the question as to the right of way in the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Company over the route upon which theyhave
constructed theirroadin Georgia, as against the claim of the Union Branch
Railroad to the same; Held, that the former Company takes no legal aid
from the resolutions of our legislature, passed in the year 1837, offering to
secure similar privileges to those enjoyed by the Western and' Atlantic
Railroad in our State, to any road in the State.of Tennessee seeking to connect therewith; provided, that the latter State would grant the privilege of
extending that road to the Tennessee River. UnionBranch Railroad vs.
East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad,
- 303
2. In the year 1840, the Legislature of Georgia incorporated the Cross
Plains and Red Clay Railroad, reserving the right to repeal the act of
incorporation. In 1847, an Act was passed granting the right of way over
the same route to others. In 1849, the legislature by act recognized the
privileges granted to said Company by the Act of 1840, changed the name
to Union Br~nch Railroad, and repealed the clause in the Act of 1840,
reserving the right to Yepeal that Act; Held, that the Act of 1849 could
not affect the rights which bad been acquired under the Act of 1847,
because that Act repealed the Act of 1840, so far as the right of way -was
concerned. Id.
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3. The Act of 1847, to which reference is made, repeals the Act of 1840,
because the legislature reserved the right to repeal that Act, and because
the Act of 1847 is directly repugnant to the Act of 1840, as to this grant of
the right of way. Id.
4. The Act of 1840 provides, that in the event of its repeal, the appointment of persons who shall "fix the value" of the work, investments and
improvements of the Company may be made either.by the repealing Act.or
by the Governor, and the stockholders. Id."
WILL.
1. A testator, residing in Louisiana, shd leaving there a large succession
by his will, after particular legacies, gave all the residue and remainder of
his estate, real and personal, o.f whatever nature, (subject to certain an.!
nuities,) "to the corporations of the cities of New Orleans ud Baltimore
foiever, one-ha to each," for intents and purposes afterwards declared.
Ire then directed'hls executors to cozivert all his personal estate into
realty, whereby the Whdle of.his estate should become a permanent fund
in real estate, "no.-art of which shall ever be touched, divided, sold or
alienated, bht shall forever remain together as one estate, -and be managed"
as he should order. Foi the manigement of this estate, he .directed the
cities each to select, annually, three agents, whose dutiy it should be to
receive seisin and possession of the estate from his executors immediately
after his death. They were to lease or rent the lots, cultivate plantations,
collect rents, pay the 'annuities,.apd, "in fine; to do all the acts'necessary
to its perfect management, according to the will;" t being the will of the
testator "that no part of the geeral estatei or revenue from rents arising
from said general estte, should go into the hands of the corporate authorities of the said cities, but that the said authorities should have forever the
supervision of it." The relations thud established between the cities and
the agents were to' be perpetual; no alteration could bemade, or sale or
trafic or surrender of or in the interests or powers given. In case of any,
combination to violate the provisions of the scheme of management, the
"general estate" was limited over to the States of Louisiana and Maryland, "for the purpose of educating the poor of those StatesP He further provided, that if there should be "a lapse of the legacies from a failure to accept, or any other cause or means whatsoever," the shares should
enure for the benefit of the State or States in which the cities are situated,
that the Legislatures thereof might carry his intentions into effect. The
testator then provided a minute and detailed scheme, in particular for the
expenditure of the revenues of the estates. One-eighth part of the annual
income for forty years to the Colonization Society; three-eighths, to be
accumulated in a particular manner, for the founding of certain charitable
institutions. The remainder of the income, and the whole, after the first
objects were fulfilled, were for the free education of the poor of the cities
of New Orleans and Baltimore. The design of the will, as appeared from
its whole tenor, was to create a perpetual foundation, without powers of
alienation or sale. Hdd:
I. That the cities were legatees by title universal; the mode of administration of the legacy being governed, however, by the plan established by "
the testator.
II. That the cities, as such, were entitled to take as legatees; and that
the purposes of the legacy were not sucb, in general, as to disentitle them
to hold.
III. That the dispositions of the will were not within the prohibition
against substitutions and .fdei commissa in the Art. 1507 of the Civil Code
of Louisiana.
IV. That the testator had authority to define the uses and destination of
his legacy.
V. That the prohibitions in the will against alienation, and division, so
far as they were illegal, were merely void in themselves, and did not vitiate
the other dispositions of the will.
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VI. That the fact of the uses for the benefit of -the city of Baltimore
being foreign.to the State of Louisiana, did not affect their validity.
VII. That if the annuities for accumulation first given were void, which
was not determined, they would merely sink for the benefit of the legatees.
VIIL And that even had the prior disposition been invalid, the limitation over to the States of Louisiana and Maryland was good. M'Donoug4
400
vs. Murdock,
2. Corporations in Louisiana may.receive legacies for purposes not foreign
to their institution. Id.
3. Thefideicommiesa prohibited in thecivil code axe only substitutionary
limitations of property, and have no analogy to common law trusts. Id.
4. The provision of the civil code (art. 2026) that ,impossible conditions,
those whith are contraryto laws ormorals, are to be reputed "niot written,"
while applicable to all modes of appropriation, use or destination, of property, by contract or legacy, in cases of legacy merely annnls the condition,
without affecting the validity of.the donation itself. Id.
6. A will eontaine.d the following clause:. "In case of having no children,
I then leave and bequeath all my real estate, at the death of my wife, to
K., on condition of his marrying a daughter of W. T.,
W. K., son of brother "J.
and my niece'L..T.,,in trust for the eldest son or issue of such marringe."
W. T. and his wifeboth.died without having had a daaghter born to them,
whereby the performance of the condition on which W. X. took the estate
became impossible. Hed by the 'Supreme Court of the United States:
L That this clause vested in W. 'K. the legal estate in fee bimple, on so
condition oubseguent. Findlay "etal.'es. King's Lessee, 8 Peters Rep.' 846.
2. But W. X. took no beneficial estate in fee, but an .estate in trus for his
issue, springing from, his intermarriage with the unborn daughter of a
husband-and wife, both of whom died without the birth of a daughter, and
that the trust having failed, there remained a resulting trust to the heirs at
law of the testator, who were entitled to artition. King w. Mitchell et al.
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8 Peters' Rep." 326. Vint vs. King,
WITNESS.
See Bond-Evidence.
WORLDLY EMPLOYMENT.
See Sunday.

